5.10.2015

Case Volkswagen – Could the Pelican Have Avoided Ploughing into the Turbine?

Case Volkswagen has been in the news for the past couple of days. According to the company, it installed software that falsified emissions tests in 11 million diesel cars, meaning that its vehicles actually spewed more pollutants than allowed.

The company’s market cap dropped by almost 40%. The CEO had to resign. The provisions in the books were raised to 6.5 billion euros.

The congestion of class action suits is about to start, and in all likelihood some directors will end up behind bars. Case Volkswagen is just one example in the world of miscalculated integrity risks.

Every day, we see a steady flow of news regarding suspected fraud, corruption, human rights abuses and falsification of accounts. How can companies avoid becoming part of this kind of news flow? Is there something the management or the board could do better despite their existing compliance programs and global control frameworks? The answer is … absolutely!

Let’s look at the three fundamental factors determining whether a company’s reputation risk management is efficient or not: reputation-reality gap, changing expectations and unity.

Mind the Gap

Volkswagen has always had a good public reputation topped off with high integrity. The Volkswagen brand has almost become a synonym for reliability. Why did this perception collapse overnight?

Volkswagen has a global compliance program and organisation in place, so in this regard everything should have been under control. Contrary to the public perception, is it possible that the company didn’t in reality have the means to exercise its integrity risk management properly? Despite express obligations of integrity in their code of conduct, for some reason the implementation failed.

Tools in Place but not Maintained?

The second explanation could be that the company did not challenge and monitor its existing risk management system. Did Volkswagen regularly acid test the functioning of its whistle-blower communications channels? Did the compliance organisation have direct and independent access to the board, or was it subject to the interests of the operative management?

Had the workability of the existing system and the independence of compliance administration been secured, the problem might never have occurred. At least it would have come to the attention of the board much earlier, allowing sufficient time to take corrective measures before it was too late.

Maybe communications channels existed, but the fear of disclosing the problem and retaliation kept mouths shut?

Walk the Talk?

The third explanation could be that the company was ultimately unable to jointly ‘walk the talk’. Was this due to a fragmented organisation, siloed decision making, fear or sub-optimisation resulting from eccentric incentivisation? Based on the latest allegations in the news, some directors were warned, but the problem was quickly polished over by ignorance. Nevertheless, the existence of flawless internal communications and internal trust can be questioned.

Reputation Risk Management 2.0

Failures in compliance always occur when a complex company structure is managed without effective risk management tools. Compliance management is not a stand-alone exercise. Instead it should be integrated into every company’s global risk management processes.

Despite existing codes of conduct, internal instructions and policies, companies should understand the essence of taking their compliance systems to the next level. Otherwise, their businesses can easily fall into ostrich management principles, i.e. putting their heads in the sand and hoping that their problems go away.

To switch back to my original bird metaphor, compliance 2.0 is absolutely crucial if you want to keep your pelicans out of the turbine.

Latest references

We advised Suominen Corporation in connection with its rights issue. The offering was oversubscribed, and the company raised gross proceeds of approximately EUR 28 million. We also advised Suominen in connection with the renegotiation of the terms of the company’s three-year EUR 100 million syndicated credit facility, under which the maturity was extended and headroom was added to the financial covenants. “I would like to thank our shareholders for their support and confidence in Suominen’s future. The completion of the Offering will enable us to accelerate the implementation of our Full Potential Program while strengthening our capital structure. Our transformation particularly focuses on enhancing the reliability and efficiency of our production and supply, and on reinforcing our commercial capabilities, allowing us to better meet the expectations of our customers and shareholders”, comments Charles Héaulmé, President and CEO of Suominen. Suominen is a nonwovens manufacturer operating in global markets. Suominen creates value by taking fiber raw materials and turning them into nonwovens that the company’s customers convert into both consumer and professional end products. Suominen’s vision is to be the frontrunner for nonwovens innovation and sustainability. Suominen’s net sales in 2025 were EUR 412.4 million and the company has almost 700 professionals working in Europe and in the Americas. Suominen’s shares are listed on Nasdaq Helsinki.
Case published 6.7.2026
We advised Aurevia Oy, a portfolio company of French private equity sponsor Mérieux Equity Partners, in a strategic reorganisation that involved splitting Aurevia and its parent companies into two independent groups of companies and reorganisation of its existing debt-financing arrangements. Following the reorganisation, the newly formed Aurevia continues as a leading provider of Contract Research Organization (CRO) and Quality Assurance and Regulatory Affairs (QARA) services, while the newly formed Labquality focuses on delivering External Quality Assessment (EQA) services. Aurevia serves operators in the medical devices, in vitro diagnostics and pharmaceutical sectors. Labquality’s customers include clinical laboratories and social and healthcare organisations. The reorganisation positions Aurevia and Labquality to allocate investments more effectively, accelerate growth within their respective customer segments, and respond to evolving market and client needs. The transaction was implemented through multiple parallel demergers and required comprehensive legal and tax structuring across several jurisdictions. Our team supported Aurevia throughout the planning and implementation phases, covering corporate, tax, employment law, and regulatory matters, as well as the optimisation of each group’s financing structure.
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We advise Fingrid Oyj in a transaction in which Ilmarinen Mutual Pension Insurance Company is selling its holding of approximately 20 per cent of the shares in Fingrid to the Finnish State and OP Pohjola Kantaverkko Holding Ky. Fingrid owns Finland’s main electricity transmission grid and all significant cross-border transmission connections. The main grid is the backbone of the electricity transmission network, to which major power plants, industrial plants and regional electricity distribution networks are connected. 
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We acted as legal adviser to EcoUp Oyj in a directed share issue, through which EcoUp raised a total of approximately EUR 3 million in gross proceeds to strengthen the company’s capital structure and finance its growth. The share issue was directed to a limited group of domestic investors, deviating from the shareholders’ pre-emptive subscription right. EcoUp’s shares are traded on the First North Growth Market Finland marketplace maintained by Nasdaq Helsinki.  EcoUp promotes the green transition of the construction industry by producing carbon-neutral, energy-efficient and circular economy-based materials, services and technologies that help construction industry players reduce their environmental impact. The company has over 40 years of experience in developing and delivering circular economy solutions to customers.
Case published 29.1.2026